Could the presumption of innocence protect the guilty? by Tomlin, Patrick
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Tomlin, Patrick (2014) Could the presumption of innocence protect the guilty? Criminal Law 
and Philosophy, 8 (2). pp. 431-447. doi:10.1007/s11572-012-9193-6 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/104426            
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
“The final publication is available at Springer : http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-012-9193-6 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP url’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
1	
	
Could	the	Presumption	of	Innocence	Protect	the	Guilty?	
Patrick	Tomlin*	
	
Criminal	Law	and	Philosophy	8.2	(2014),	pp.	431-447 
	
Abstract	
	
At	criminal	trial,	we	demand	that	those	accused	of	criminal	wrongdoing	be	presumed	
innocent	until	proven	guilty	beyond	any	reasonable	doubt.	What	are	the	moral	and/or	
political	grounds	of	this	demand?	One	popular	and	natural	answer	to	this	question	focuses	on	
the	moral	badness	or	wrongness	of	convicting	and	punishing	innocent	persons,	which	I	call	
the	direct	moral	grounding.	In	this	essay,	I	suggest	that	this	direct	moral	grounding,	if	
accepted,	may	well	have	important	ramifications	for	other	areas	of	the	criminal	justice	
process,	and	in	particular	those	parts	in	which	we	(through	our	legislatures	and	judges)	decide	
how	much	punishment	to	distribute	to	guilty	persons.	If,	as	the	direct	moral	grounding	
suggests,	we	should	prefer	under-punishment	to	over-punishment	under	conditions	of	
uncertainty,	due	to	the	moral	seriousness	of	errors	which	inappropriately	punish	persons,	then	
we	should	also	prefer	erring	on	the	side	of	under-punishment	when	considering	how	much	to	
punish	those	who	may	justly	be	punished.	Some	objections	to	this	line	of	thinking	are	
considered.		
	
Key	Words:	Presumption	of	innocence;	standard	of	proof;	sentencing;	tariff-setting.	
	
	
Introduction	
There	are	two	obvious	answers	to	our	title	question:	obviously	yes;	and	obviously	no.	The	
obvious	affirmative	answer	is	that	the	presumption	of	innocence	protects	the	factually	guilty	
who	have	yet	to	be	found	legally	guilty.	Imagine	Kerry	has	committed	a	crime,	but	has	refused	
to	plead	guilty.	At	trial,	she	is	entitled	to	receive	the	protection	afforded	by	the	presumption	of	
innocence,	even	though	she	is	in	fact	guilty	of	the	crime	of	which	she	is	accused.	The	obvious	
negative	answer	is	that	once	Kerry	has	been	found	legally	guilty,	she	is	no	longer	entitled	to	be	
presumed	innocent	(of	that	particular	crime).	
	
I’m	not	interested	in	either	of	those	obvious	answers	here.	Rather,	I	want	to	see	whether,	and	
put	forward	a	case	that	suggests	that,	the	presumption	of	innocence	(and	the	attendant	high	
standard	of	proof	required	to	overturn	it)	that	we	acknowledge	as	proper	in	a	criminal	trial	
can	continue	to	offer	some	protection	to	those	who	have	been	found	legally	guilty	–	i.e.,	those	
who	we	have	already	decided	are	guilty	beyond	reasonable	doubt	and	are	going	to	be	
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punished	for	their	crime.	In	particular,	I	suggest	that	the	trial	presumption	and	standard	may	
protect	the	guilty	when	we	are	deciding	how	much	punishment	they	ought	to	receive	(either	
ex	ante	through	legislation,	or	ex	post	through	sentencing).	It	may	seem	that	this	is	a	
contradiction	–	after	all,	I	have	just	said	that	it	is	obvious	that	such	persons	are	not	entitled	to	
be	presumed	innocent.	The	protection	that	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	standard	of	
proof	may	offer	them,	however,	is	indirect.	They	are	not	entitled	to	the	same	protections	that	
they	are	afforded	at	trial,	but	if	we	accept	that	the	these	procedural	principles	are	directly	
morally	grounded	in	a	concern	to	avoid	the	serious	badness	or	wrongness	of	punishing	people	
who	do	not	deserve,	or	are	not	liable	to,	punishment,	then	the	principles	revealed	by	that	
grounding	(rather	than	the	procedural	rules	themselves)	may	offer	protection	to	those	who	
have	already	been	found	guilty.	In	short,	the	argument	is	that	since	this	direct	moral	
grounding	states	that,	morally	speaking,	we	should	prefer	letting	the	guilty	go	free	to	
punishing	the	innocent,	it	reveals	a	moral	preference	for	under-punishment	over	over-
punishment	under	conditions	of	uncertainty.	This,	it	is	argued,	suggests	that	we	should	prefer	
under-punishing	to	over-punishing	the	guilty	as	well.	If	the	presumption	of	innocence	is	
grounded	in	a	concern	to	avoid	the	intrinsic	moral	badness	or	wrongness	of	inappropriate	
punishment,	then	it	seems	that	we	should	be	as	concerned	with	avoiding	punishing	the	guilty	
too	much	as	we	are	with	avoiding	punishing	the	innocent,	since	these	errors	are	ultimately	of	
the	same	type	–	giving	people	punishment	they	should	not,	in	fact,	receive.	
	
If	the	analogy	between	the	errors	possible	in	deciding	whether	to	convict	and	those	possible	in	
deciding	how	much	to	punish	is	taken	to	be	full-blown,	then	legislatures	should	only	prescribe	
punishments,	and	judges	should	only	hand	them	down,	to	the	extent	that	they	are	sure	
beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	such	a	punishment	will	not	over-punish	the	offender.	However,	
weaker	interpretations	of	the	argument	are	also	available,	as	I	will	explain	further.	I	do	not	
defend	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	presumption	here,	although,	in	the	section	that	
follows,	I	will	elucidate	it	and	show	how	it	is	a	common,	and	indeed	the	dominant,	way	to	
justify	the	presumption	of	innocence,	and	one	that	is	supported	by	those	who	offer	opposing	
views	on	debates	concerning	the	presumption	within	positive	law.	Nevertheless,	my	thesis	is	a	
conditional	one:	it	explains	how	we	should	treat	the	guilty	if	the	presumption	is	directly	
morally	grounded.	It	may	be,	however,	that	the	direct	moral	grounding	does	not	offer	the	
correct	or	best	justification	of	the	presumption	and	related	standard	of	proof,	and	we	should,	
perhaps,	seek	alternative	ways	of	justifying	the	presumption.	
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The	presumption	of	innocence	and	its	direct	moral	grounding	
Here	is	a	somewhat	stylised1	account	of	how,	in	a	democratic	society,	some	particular	person	
comes	to	be	punished	for	some	particular	crime:	
	
Stage	1:	Legislation	
Some	body	or	bodies	of	representatives	create	a	law	which	deems	that:	
i. Some	conduct	is	worthy	of	punishment	and	is	therefore	to	be	prohibited	by	
criminal	law	(criminalisation)2	
ii. Those	found	to	have	acted	in	this	way	are	to	be	subjected	to	punishment	
within	a	certain	range3	(tariff-setting)	
	
Stage	2:	Trial	
Some	particular	person	is	accused	of	having	acted	in	the	way	criminalised	by	the	legislator.	A	
trial	is	set	up	to	deem	whether	they	did	or	did	not	act	in	this	way.	
Stage	3:	Sentencing	
If	a	person	is	found	guilty	at	Stage	2,	a	judge	may	distribute	some	punishment	to	them,	within	
the	range	specified	by	the	legislator	at	Stage	1.ii	(tariff-setting).	
	
At	Stage	2	we	impose	various	procedural	norms	which	protect	the	accused.	These	include	the	
presumption	of	innocence	and	a	high	standard	of	proof,	which	together	demand	that	the	
person	or	persons	charged	with	deciding	whether	the	accused	is	guilty	or	not	initially	presume	
the	alleged	offender	to	be	innocent,	and	that	they	have	a	high	degree	of	confidence	in	the	
proposition	‘the	defendant	committed	the	crime’	before	they	allow	themselves	to	declare	the	
defendant	guilty.	At	Stage	1	we	usually	apply	democratic	majoritarian	rules	to	aggregate	votes,	
and	(so	far	as	I	know)	there	are	no	political	rules	or	norms	that	suggest	what	the	individual	
legislator’s	credence	in	the	proposition	‘Conduct	A	ought	to	be	criminal’	should	be	before	she	
is	prepared	to	vote	for	its	being	criminalised,	or	the	level	of	punishment	that	ought	to	
accompany	it.	Similarly,	I	do	not	know	of	any	rules	or	culture	surrounding	how	sure	a	judge	at	
																																								 																				
1	One	of	the	ways	in	which	it	is	oversimplified	is	that	it	does	not	afford	prosecutors	the	central	role	that	
they	in	fact	play	in	deciding	who	will	be	charged,	and	with	what.	A	fully-developed	account	of	what	the	
direct	moral	grounding	of	the	presumption	of	innocence	tells	us	about	the	entire	criminal	justice	
system	would	have	to	recognise	and	incorporate	this	central	role	that	prosecutors	play.	I	am	grateful	to	
Doug	Husak	for	pointing	this	out	to	me.	
2	I	assume	here,	and	throughout,	that	in	criminalising	the	conduct,	the	legislature	judges	that	that	
conduct	is,	at	least	sometimes,	worthy	of	punishment,	and	that	this	is	what	makes	the	conduct	
appropriate	for	regulation	by,	and	what	is	distinctive	about,	the	criminal	law.	
3	This	range	may	extend	downward	to	‘no	punishment’	but	must	(as	per	note	2)	extend	upward	to	‘some	
punishment’.	
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Stage	3	ought	to	be	that	the	punishment	they	dish	out	(within	the	range	specified	by	the	
legislature)	is	not	too	much	punishment.	
	
The	presumption	of	innocence,	on	its	own,	is	not	much	to	write	home	about.	It	offers	hardly	
any	protection	to	any	suspected	offender.	Imagine,	for	example,	a	rule	that	said	that	we	must	
presume	all	persons	innocent	until	we	think	we	may	have	heard	a	rumour	that	they	might	be	
guilty.	Whilst	such	a	rule	contains	the	injunction	that	we	initially	presume	persons	to	be	
innocent,	the	standard	of	proof	(if	it	can	even	be	called	that)	required	to	overturn	that	initial	
presumption	is	so	wishy-washy	that	it	would	not	offer	adequate	protection	to	suspected	
offenders.	Therefore,	to	have	any	teeth,	and	to	be	worthy	of	being	called,	as	Viscount	Sankey	
famously	called	the	presumption,	the	‘golden	thread’	of	a	legal	system	(Simester	&	Sullivan	
2003,	64;	Ashworth	2006,	83),	the	presumption	of	innocence	must	be	coupled	with	a	robust	
epistemic	standard	required	to	overturn	that	initial	presumption.	In	many	jurisdictions,	such	
as	the	one	I	am	writing	in,	the	standard	is	one	of	‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’.	Since	the	
presumption	of	innocence	only	offers	the	kind	of	robust	protection	associated	with	it	when	it	
is	coupled	with	this	kind	of	standard	of	proof,	I	will	run	presumption	and	standard	together	in	
this	essay,	both	in	the	sense	that	I	will	discuss	them	together,	as	one,	and	will	assume	that	
they	should	be	justified	together,	motivated	by	the	same	kinds	of	concerns.	This	gives	us	a	
principle	like	this	one:	
Presumption	of	Innocence	Principle	(PIP):	accused	persons	are	to	be	presumed	
innocent	until	proven	guilty	beyond	any	reasonable	doubt.	
	
There	are	some	very	interesting	legal	debates	about	how	best	to	understand	and	interpret	the	
presumption	of	innocence	in	positive	law.	In	particular,	such	debate	focuses	on	whether	the	
presumption	is	a	purely	procedural	principle	for	use	at	trial,	or	whether	it	can	or	should	have	
any	role	in	enacting,	interpreting	or	evaluating	(and	possibly	even	striking	down)	criminal	
laws.	For	example,	does	a	law	which	lowers	the	standard	of	proof	through	the	content	of	the	
offence	(‘it	is	a	crime	to	be	reasonably	suspected	of	X’)	fail	to	respect	the	presumption,	or	is	
the	presumption	of	innocence,	being	a	procedural	principle	for	criminal	trials,	simply	not	the	
kind	of	principle	which	substantive	criminal	statutes	can	or	cannot	respect?4	
	
These	debates	can	be	fascinating,	but	I	am	not	going	to	venture	into	them	here.	That	is	
because	regardless	of	whether	or	not	the	positive	law	presumption	or	standard	of	proof	can	
																																								 																				
4	Contributions	to	this	debate	include:	Tadros	&	Tierney	2004;	Tadros	2007;	Roberts	2005;	Duff	2005.	
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tell	us	something	about	how	we	should	view	or	treat	existing	criminal	statutes,	there	are	
further	questions	about	why	we	support	the	PIP	(what	are	its	moral	and/or	political	grounds?)	
and	whether	or	not	those	can	tell	us	something	about	how	we	ought	to	make	laws	or	treat	
guilty	persons.	These	normative	questions	about	what	our	criminal	process	(broadly	
conceived,	from	legislation	through	to	sentencing)	should	look	like,	and	what	the	grounds	of	
the	PIP	might	tell	us	about	what	they	should	look	like,	are	the	kinds	of	questions	I	am	
concerned	with	here,	and	they	do	not	depend	on	our	answers	as	to	how	we	ought	to	view	the	
presumption	of	innocence	or	standard	of	proof	as	a	matter	of	positive	law.	
	
To	illustrate	this,	consider	the	justifications	offered	for	the	presumption	of	innocence	by	two	
opposing	protagonists	in	this	debate	concerning	the	best	interpretation	of	the	presumption	in	
positive	law.	Victor	Tadros,	who	has	a	‘wide’	or	‘substantive’	view	of	the	presumption,	argues	
(with	Stephen	Tierney)	that	the	presumption	is	justified	because	‘it	is	generally	seen	as	better	
for	the	guilty	to	go	free	than	for	the	innocent	to	be	convicted’	(Tadros	&	Tierney	2004,	402).	
Meanwhile,	Paul	Roberts,	who	advocates	a	‘narrow’	or	‘proceduralist’	interpretation	of	the	
presumption	of	innocence,	says	that	the	presumption	is	justified	‘because	wrongful	conviction,	
censure	and	punishment	are	such	grave	injustices	that	strenuous	efforts	must	be	made	–	
sometimes	involving	the	sacrifice	of	other	interests	and	values	–	in	order	to	minimize	the	risk	
of	condemning	the	innocent...The	presumption’s	normative	significance	lies	in	the	moral	
imperative	of	expressing	official	censure	of	criminal	wrongdoing,	and	the	correspondingly	
grave	injustice	of	wrongfully	convicting	a	person	who	is	innocent.’	(Roberts	2005,	188).	Thus,	
although	Tadros	and	Roberts	offer	contrasting	interpretations	of	how	courts	should	interpret	
the	presumption,	they	offer	strikingly	similar	normative	justifications	for	the	presumption	and	
its	central	place	in	our	criminal	procedure	and	legal	culture.	Both	focus	on	the	grave	error	of	
mistaken	conviction.	Note	that	in	doing	so,	they	also,	as	I	do,	seem	to	assume	that	
presumption	and	standard	are	justified	in	the	same	way.5	
	
Indeed,	the	justifications	offered	by	Tadros	and	Roberts	are	pretty	standard	and	cohere	with	
many	other	explicit	or	suggested	defences	of	the	PIP.	They	invoke	William	Blackstone’s	
famous	claim	that	‘it	is	better	that	ten	guilty	persons	escape,	than	that	one	innocent	suffer.’	
																																								 																				
5	It	should	be	noted	that	I	have	used	the	justifications	offered	by	Tadros	and	Robinson	in	print.	After	
conversation	with	both,	at	the	event	for	which	this	paper	was	originally	written,	I	am	not	sure	that	
either	would	currently	endorse	the	direct	moral	grounding.	But	that	they	both	reached	for	it,	or	
something	very	close	to	it,	in	earlier	work,	is	instructive,	I	think,	both	of	how	natural	a	way	it	is	to	
understand	the	PIP,	and	in	showing	how	both	sides	of	the	substantive/procedural	divide	have	found	it	a	
natural	way	to	think	about	the	PIP.	
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(Blackstone	1836,	358).	This	type	of	justification,	which	focuses	our	attention	on	the	badness	
or	wrongness	of	punishing	the	innocent,	and	holds	avoiding	such	an	outcome	to	be	
significantly	more	important	than	convicting	the	guilty,	is	so	common	that	Larry	Laudan	
claims	that	the	legal	community	has	been	‘fixated’	on	Blackstone’s	ratio	for	more	than	two	
centuries,	and	that	our	rules	of	evidence	and	procedure	are	‘founded...on	a	faith	that	
Blackstone’s	intuitions	about	the	respective	costs	of	error	are	sound	and	that	they	should	be	
foundational’	(Laudan	2011,	197).	
	
Such	justifications	of	the	PIP	offer	what	I	call	a	direct	moral	grounding.	That	is,	they	offer	a	
story	in	which	the	procedural	principle	of	the	PIP	is	intimately	and	directly	connected	to	our	
moral	beliefs,	in	particular	about	the	badness	or	wrongness	of	punishing	the	innocent	and	the	
moral	importance	of	avoiding	such	an	outcome.	In	order	to	hold	the	PIP	as	directly	morally	
grounded,	you	would,	I	think,	have	to	affirm	two	principles.	One	is	an	objective	moral	
principle	(in	that	it	spells	out	what	should	be	done,	or	what	the	best	state	of	affairs	is,	
regardless	of	our	epistemic	limitations);	the	other	is	a	subjective	moral	principle	(in	that	it	
spells	out	what	should	be	done	in	light	of	our	epistemic	limitations).6	The	objective	moral	
principle	declares	that	there	is	a	fundamental	and	important	moral	difference	between	
punishing	the	innocent	and	punishing	the	guilty.	This	is	the	kind	of	principle	that	is	typically	
invoked	in	arguing	against	purely	deterrence-based	justifications	of	punishment.	The	second,	
subjective,	principle	spells	out	what	we	ought	to	do	in	a	world	(like	ours)	where	we	do	not	
know	with	absolute	certainty	who	the	guilty	are.	It	urges	us	to	err	on	the	side	of	under-
punishing,	since	punishing	the	innocent	(as	per	Blackstone)	is	far	worse	than	letting	the	guilty	
go	free.	Thus	a	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	would	read	something	like	this:	
	
DMG1	(Objective):	Punishment	is	only	appropriately	directed	toward	those	who	have	
performed	punishable	acts.7	
																																								 																				
6	A	good	illustration	of	the	distinction	between	these	two	types	of	principle	(objective	and	subjective)	
can	be	found	in	the	following	two	utilitarian	principles.	Objective	Principle:	The	best	state	of	affairs	is	
one	in	which	happiness	is	maximised.	Subjective	Principle:	Act	so	as	to	maximise	expected	happiness.	
7	Although	many	who	adhere	to	DMG1	will	be	retributivists,	I	have	avoided	the	language	of	desert	here.	
That	is	because	such	language	suggests	that	it	is	not	only	(objectively)	permissible	to	punish	the	guilty,	
but	that	it	is	good	to	do	so.	However,	others	may	support	DMG1	without	endorsing	this	controversial	
retributivist	belief.	For	example,	those	who	adhere	to	‘multi-level’	justifications	of	punishment,	or	those	
who	see	the	guilty	as	liable	to	punishment,	but	not	deserving	of	it,	can	support	DMG1	without	being	
through	and	through	retributivists.	Thus,	‘appropriate’	here	acts	as	a	placeholder	for	a	variety	of	
justificatory	relationships	between	guilt	and	punishment,	one	of	which	is	desert.	For	examples	of	such	
positions,	see:	Hart	1959-60;	Rawls	2001;	Tadros	2011.		
7	
	
DMG2	(Subjective):	Punishment	should	only	be	directed	toward	those	whom	we	are	
sure	beyond	any	reasonable	doubt	may	be	appropriately	punished,	as	per	DMG1.	
Therefore,	PIP:	Persons	should	be	presumed	innocent	until	proven	guilty	beyond	all	
reasonable	doubt.	
	
Most	defences	of	the	PIP	appear	to	employ	something	like	this	reasoning.8	It	is	not	my	
intention	to	defend	it	here,	but	rather	to	see	what,	if	accepted,	such	reasoning	can	tell	us	
about	how,	in	all	consistency,	we	ought	to	treat	those	who	are	found	guilty	of	a	(just)	crime.	It	
is	my	contention	that	the	following	conditional	claim	may	well	be	true:	if	the	PIP	is	directly	
morally	grounded,	we	ought	only	to	punish	persons	to	the	extent	that	we	are	sure	beyond	any	
reasonable	doubt	that	we	are	not	punishing	them	too	much.9	Therefore,	if	there	is	reasonable	
doubt	as	to	whether	a	punishment	is	too	harsh,	it	should	not	be	legislated	for	at	Stage	1.i,	or	
delivered	at	Stage	3.	At	the	least,	I	think	that	the	direct	moral	grounding,	if	correct,	should	
inform	our	tariff-setting	and	sentencing	decisions,	and	will	offer	significant	protection	to	the	
guilty,	even	if	there	are	good	reasons	not	to	set	the	bar	as	high	as	we	do	at	trial.	
	
PIP	and	tarriff-setting	and	sentencing	
In	a	previous	article	(Tomlin,	forthcoming),	I	have	explored	what	the	direct	moral	grounding	
of	the	PIP	may	tell	us	about	our	criminalising	practices	and	institutions	(i.e.,	Stage	1.i).10	Here	I	
																																								 																				
8	There	are	two,	slightly	differing,	routes	that	one	may	travel	from	DMG1	to	DMG2:	in	one	route,	the	
importance	of	setting	the	innocent	free	outweighs	the	importance	of	convicting	the	guilty;	in	the	other,	
the	importance	of	setting	the	innocent	free	overrides	the	importance	of	convicting	the	guilty.	
Blackstone	appears	to	offer	the	outweighing	approach,	whilst	someone	like	Laurence	Tribe	(1970)	offers	
the	overriding	approach.	See	Tomlin	forthcoming,	section	III	for	further	discussion.	
9	Or,	at	least,	punishing	a	person	too	much	in	such	a	way	that	will	wrong	the	person.	I	add	this	
qualification	since	some	theories	of	punishment	may	have	a	plurality	of	conditions	on	permissible	
punishment,	only	some	of	which	are	relevant	here,	as	only	some	may	involve	wronging	the	person.	As	
an	illustration,	Victor	Tadros	(to	whom	I	am	grateful	for	making	this	point	to	me)	has	a	theory	of	
punishment	in	which	punishment	is	only	permissible	when:	(a)	the	person	is	liable	to	punishment;	(b)	
the	punishment	is	necessary	to	avert	some	future	harm;	and	(c)	it	is	proportionate.	Arguably,	on	such	a	
view,	if	a	person	is	liable	to	punishment	and	the	punishment	does	not	exceed	some	maximum	penalty	
appropriate	to	that	sort	of	wrongdoing,	we	would	not,	in	giving	the	person	a	punishment	which	turned	
out	to	be	non-necessary	(but	which	we	did	not	know	was	non-necessary),	wrong	the	person,	even	if	
doing	so	means	that	we	act	(objectively,	and	all-things-considered)	impermissibly.	That	is,	whilst	we	
would	have	given	too	much	punishment,	we	would	not	have	given	too	much	punishment	in	the	way	
that	animates	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP.	Whether	any	given	element	of	a	theory	of	
permissible	punishment	involves	the	risk	of	wronging	the	accused	or	simply	acting	impermissibly	will	be	
a	matter	for	each	individual	theory	of	punishment.	For	Tadros’	theory,	see:	Tadros	2011,	esp.	Part	IV.	
10	The	reasoning	goes	that	the	direct	moral	grounding	focuses	our	attention	on	the	intrinsic	moral	
badness	or	wrongness	of	inappropriate	punishment.	And	since	it	is	unjust	punishment	that	ultimately	
worries	us,	then	we	ought	to	be	equally	worried	about	the	differing	routes	by	which	it	may	come	to	us,	
including	unjust	criminalisation.	Therefore	the	direct	moral	grounding	seems	to	suggest	that	we	should	
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want	to	see	whether	a	similar	argument	can	be	made	with	regard	to	Stages	1.ii	and	3	of	the	
criminal	justice	process,	namely	tariff-setting	and	sentencing	–	the	stages	which	(in	
conjunction)	decide	how	much	punishment	a	guilty	person	should	receive.	Such	an	argument	
will	be	based	on	an	equivalence	thesis,	namely:	
Equivalence	Thesis	2	(ET2):	Punishing	someone	more	than	they	should	be	punished	is	
ultimately	the	same	kind	of	error	as	punishing	someone	for	something	that	they	did	
not,	in	fact,	do.	Neither	error	is	inherently	worse	than	the	other.	
	
If	we	believe	that	there	are	procedure-independent	limits	to	how	much	we	may	punish	
persons,	either	in	general	or	for	particular	crimes	(if,	for	example,	we	believe	that	legislatures	
ought	not	to	prescribe	the	death	penalty,	or	custodial	sentences	for	minor	traffic	offences)	
then	we	believe	that	legislatures	and	judges	can	make	errors	in	deciding	how	much	to	punish	
the	guilty	–	they	can	over-punish.	ET2	claims	that	this	is	ultimately	the	same	kind	of	error	as	
punishing	the	innocent.	ET2	can	be	supported,	or	motivated,	via	two	routes	–	by	thinking	
about	whether,	at	root,	the	error	of	punishing	someone	too	much	is	the	same	kind	of	error	as	
punishing	the	innocent	(the	bad	outcome	which	is	declared	so	fearsome	in	the	direct	moral	
grounding	of	the	PIP),	and	by	thinking	of	cases	which	seem	to	support	ET2	(by	showing	both	
that	the	error	does	indeed	seem	to	be	of	the	same	type,	and	that	it	can	be	just	as	serious).	
	
As	regards	the	first	route,	punishing	someone	too	much	is,	indeed,	at	root,	the	same	kind	of	
error	as	punishing	an	innocent	person.	Both,	ultimately,	are	errors	of	over-punishment.	In	the	
case	of	wrongful	conviction	(and,	indeed,	in	the	case	of	wrongful	criminalisation)	someone	
who	should	receive	no	punishment	receives	some	punishment11,	whilst	in	the	case	of	punishing	
someone	too	much,	someone	who	should	receive	some	punishment	receives	too	much.	Either	
way,	a	person	receives	punishment	which	(objectively)	they	should	not	receive.	Punishing	
someone	too	much	is	akin	to	punishing	them	after	they	have	already	been	appropriately	
punished.	It	is	like	punishing	them	for	a	second	time	for	the	same	crime	–	if	the	person	should	
receive	six	months	in	jail,	then	putting	them	in	jail	for	a	year	gives	them	a	double	sentence.	
This	is	the	same	kind	of	error	as	giving	somebody	a	first	sentence	of	six	months	through	
wrongful	conviction.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
only	criminalise	when	we	are	sure	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	the	conduct	is	justly	criminalisable.	
The	argument	for	this	conclusion	is	based	on	an	equivalence	thesis:	
Equivalence	Thesis	1	(ET1):	It	can	be	as	bad	or	worse	to	punish	someone	for	something	that	
they	should	not,	in	fact,	be	punished	for,	as	it	is	to	punish	someone	for	something	that	they	did	
not,	in	fact,	do.	Both	are	ultimately	the	same	kind	of	error.	
11	Or,	at	least,	will	ordinarily	receive	some	punishment.	I	discuss	below	the	fact	that	conviction	does	not	
always	lead	to	punishment.	
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As	regards	the	second	route,	here	is	a	case	which	helps	illustrate	this.	Consider	Adam,	who	is	
wrongly	convicted	of	littering,	and	fined	£200.	Now	consider	Charlie,	who	is	correctly	
convicted	of	littering	but	is	sent	to	prison	for	five	years.	The	injustice	that	Charlie	suffers	is	
ultimately	of	the	same	type	that	Adam	suffers	–	punishment	she	should	not	receive	–	and	the	
injustice	she	suffers	is	greater:	the	punishment	is	so	grossly	disproportionate	that	she	is	
wronged	far	more	than	Adam	is	–	he	only	has	to	pay	a	small	fine	and	receive	mild	censure	
when	he	should	receive	none.	If	we	think	the	potential	injustice	that	someone	who	is	accused	
of	littering	and	may	receive	a	small	fine	may	suffer	is	so	serious	that	it	warrants	the	protection	
of	the	PIP,	why	are	similar	presumptions	and	protections	not	in	place	for	the	guilty,	who	may	
suffer	greater	injustice	still?	
	
Two	types	of	error:	factual	and	normative	
Before	moving	on	to	examine	some	reasons	why	conviction	decisions	on	the	one	hand	and	
tariff-setting	and	sentencing	decisions	on	the	other	may	be	importantly	different,	I	want	to	
separate	out	two	different	kinds	of	error	that	the	thesis	defended	could	potentially	apply	to:	
factual	errors	and	normative	errors.	Although	I	argue	that	both	kinds	of	error	are	ultimately	of	
the	same	type	and	potentially	as	serious	as	one	another,	a	more	limited	thesis	would	see	the	
protections	afforded	to	defendants	through	the	PIP	extended	to	the	guilty	in	the	case	of	
factual	errors	only.	
	
In	regard	to	factual	errors,	consider	the	case	of	Charles	Shonubi.	Shonubi	was	arrested	and	
convicted	of	drug-smuggling	after	being	caught	at	JFK	airport	with	427.4	grams	of	heroin	
contained	in	balloons	which	he	had	swallowed.12	However,	in	sentencing	Shonubi,	the	judge,	
guided	by	the	Federal	Sentencing	Guidelines,	had	to	take	into	account	not	only	the	427.4g	that	
had	been	found	on	Shonubi,	but	the	total	quantity	of	drugs	that	Shonubi	had	smuggled	(Bring	
&	Aitken	1997).	Therefore,	whilst	Shonubi’s	conviction	was	for	the	crimes	associated	with	the	
427.4g	found	in	him	at	JFK,	the	sentencing	also	took	into	account	an	estimated	amount	of	
drugs	he	was	thought	to	have	brought	in	across	seven	prior	smuggling	trips	to	the	USA.	The	
initial	sentence	was	calculated	on	the	basis	that	Shonubi	had	smuggled	3419.2g,	since	he	had	
made	eight	trips	and	was	caught	with	427.4g	(8x427.4=3419.2).	The	case	then	bounced	back	
and	forth	between	the	District	Court	and	the	Second	Circuit	Court.	Several	issues	are	raised	by	
the	case.	One	is	what	kinds	of	evidence	can	be	brought	to	bear	in	sentencing	decisions.	The	
																																								 																				
12	For	a	summary	of	the	cases	involving	Shonubi	and	discussion	of	some	of	the	normative	issues	
involved,	see	Colyvan,	Regan	&	Ferson	2001.	
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question	that	confronts	us	here,	however,	is:	how	sure	should	we	ask	that	a	judge	be	that	
Shonubi	had	smuggled	3419.2g	before	basing	his	sentence	on	that	amount?	
	
Another	way	that	this	question	may	arise	is	this.	Imagine	that	Jonathan	is	correctly	convicted	
of	a	(just)	crime.	He	ought	to	be	punished.	The	sentencing	guidelines	(correctly)	state	that	
certain	aggravating	factors	should	enhance	the	penalty	a	judge	delivers	(for	example,	if	the	
crime	was	committed	with	a	racist	motivation).	How	sure	need	the	judge	be	that	the	
aggravating	factors	were	present	before	including	them	as	part	of	the	considerations	for	
sentencing?	
	
Surely,	if	we	think,	as	per	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP,	that	the	badness	or	
wrongness	of	inappropriate	punishment	is	sufficiently	serious	such	that	information	used	for	
conviction	must	be	established	beyond	reasonable	doubt,	then	we	should	expect	the	same	
standard	of	information	used	to	calculate	sentences.	If	a	judge	uses	information	in	passing	
sentence,	he	punishes	you	on	the	basis	of	that	information.	If	that	is	past	conduct,	he	punishes	
you	for	that	conduct.	At	trial,	we	don’t	accept	that	you	should	be	convicted	for	past	conduct	
unless	that	conduct	has	been	proven	beyond	reasonable	doubt.	You	are	then	punished	on	the	
basis	of	that	conviction	(and	thus	that	conduct).	Why	let	additional	conduct	slip	in	the	back	
door	later	on,	at	a	lower	standard,	when	sentencing?13	
																																								 																				
13	In	a	series	of	decisions,	the	US	Supreme	Court	has	ruled	that,	in	certain	circumstances,	allowing	
conduct	to	slip	in	the	back	door	at	a	lower	standard	at	the	sentencing	stage	is	unconstitutional.	See:	
Apprendi	v.	New	Jersey,	530	US	466	(2000);	Ring	v.	Arizona,	536	US	584	(2002);	Blakely	v.	Washington,	
542	U.S.	296	(2004);	United	States	v.	Booker,	543	US	220	(2005).	The	important	principle,	established	in	
Apprendi,	is	that	‘[o]ther	than	the	fact	of	a	prior	conviction,	any	fact	that	increases	the	penalty	for	a	
crime	beyond	the	prescribed	statutory	maximum	must	be	submitted	to	a	jury,	and	proved	beyond	a	
reasonable	doubt.’	However,	the	Apprendi	principle	differs	from	the	position	explored	here,	and	the	
reasoning	offered	in	support	of	it,	in	two	crucial	respects.	Firstly,	the	strict	epistemic	standard	of	
beyond	reasonable	doubt	must	only	be	met	when	the	judge	seeks	to	impose	a	sentence	beyond	the	
standard	range,	and	not	when	the	judge	applies	aggravating	factors	within	the	standard	range	(see	
Williams	v.	New	York	337	US	241	(1949)).	As	Williams	shows,	within	the	standard	range,	or	in	an	
indeterminate	sentencing	regime,	judges	are	permitted	to	hand	down	whatever	sentence	they	choose,	
and	the	facts	on	which	they	base	their	decisions	need	not	be	shown	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.	Indeed,	
as	Justice	Breyer	notes,	dissenting	in	Blakely,	under	such	systems,	‘the	judge	could	vary	the	sentence	
greatly	based	upon	his	findings	about	how	the	defendant	had	committed	the	crime	–	findings	that	
might	not	have	been	made	by	a	“preponderance	of	the	evidence”	much	less	“beyond	a	reasonable	
doubt.”’	As	was	stated	in	McMillan	v.	Pennsylvania	477	US	79	(1986),	‘Sentencing	courts	have	
traditionally	heard	evidence	and	found	facts	without	any	prescribed	burden	of	proof	at	all.’	Secondly,	
the	Apprendi	principle	states	both	that	facts	increasing	sentences	beyond	the	standard	range	must	be	
established	beyond	reasonable	doubt	and	that	it	must	be	a	jury	who	decides	whether	the	facts	have	
been	so	established.	Importantly,	the	Supreme	Court’s	stance	is	more	focused	on	the	jury	being	the	
appropriate	decision-maker	than	on	the	appropriate	decision	standard	(which	is	all	my	argument	here	
focuses	on).	As	the	Court’s	decision	in	Blakely	(written	by	Justice	Scalia)	states,	‘Our	commitment	to	
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However,	empirical	errors,	such	as	the	amount	previously	smuggled	(or	not)	by	Charles	
Shonubi	and	the	presence	(or	not)	of	aggravating	factors	are	but	one	way	in	which	we	can	
deliver	too	much	punishment	–	we	can	make	normative	errors	too.	Even	when	we	know	all	the	
(non-moral)	facts,	we	must	still	decide	how	much	to	punish	given	those	facts.	Unless	we	think	
that	the	legally	defined	punishment	for	a	crime	is,	by	definition,	the	morally	correct	one,	then	
we	think	that	legislators	and	judges	can	make	moral	errors	–	they	can	punish	too	much	–	and	
as	such	inappropriate	(for	example,	undeserved)	punishment	can	be	the	result	of	such	errors.	
Think	of	Charlie,	languishing	in	jail	for	five	years	for	littering.	Charlie	did	it.	The	punishment	
is	in	accordance	with	the	laws	of	the	land.	But	the	punishment	is	disproportionate.	My	
argument	is	that	both	kinds	of	error	are	(all	else	equal)	as	serious,	and	ultimately	of	the	same	
type,	as	one	another,	and	therefore	I	think	that	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	(if	
correct)	ought	to	inform	the	way	that	that	we	should	err	in	cases	of	both	empirical	and	moral	
uncertainty.	However,	a	weaker	thesis	would	apply	such	reasoning	only	to	empirical	errors.	It	
would	say	that	any	empirical	information	to	be	used	in	sentencing	must	be	proven	beyond	
reasonable	doubt.	
	
The	direct	moral	grounding	seems	to	suggest	that	we	ought	only	to	punish	persons	when	
we’re	sure	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	we’re	not	punishing	when	we	should	not	be.	This	will	
include	punishing	people	too	much	for	crimes	that	they	have,	in	fact,	committed.	Beyond	
reasonable	doubt	may	be	an	impossible	or	impractical	standard	to	expect	in	practice,	but	
moral	consistency	would	appear	to	demand	it,	and	we	could	certainly	move	closer	to	it.	
Consider	the	following	example.	The	legislature	is	enacting	a	new	crime,	making	it	a	criminal	
offence	to	ϕ.	49%	of	the	legislature	are	sure	that	ϕ-ing	ought	to	attract	a	maximum	penalty	of	
two	years	imprisonment,	whilst	the	other	51%	place	49%	credence	in	the	two	year	maximum	
penalty	and	51%	credence	in	the	idea	that	the	appropriate	maximum	is	four	years.	Almost	half	
the	legislature	is	sure	that	four	years	is	too	much.	The	others	(just	over	half)	think	it	almost	as	
likely	as	not	that	four	years	is	too	much.	Yet	if	legislators	vote	on	a	balance-of-probabilities	
basis	and	with	a	simple	majority-wins	rule,	the	legislature	would	attach	a	maximum	penalty	of	
four	years	imprisonment	to	ϕ-ing,	despite	a	widespread	belief	that	this	would	be	to	punish	too	
much.	Given	the	great	lengths	we	go	to	to	avoid	convicting	and	punishing	the	innocent,	can	
we	justify	being	quite	so	blasé	about	punishing	people	too	much?	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
Apprendi	in	this	context	reflects	not	just	respect	for	longstanding	precedent,	but	the	need	to	give	
intelligible	content	to	the	right	of	jury	trial.’	
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Innocence	and	guilt	vs.	more	and	less	punishment	
So	far	the	argument	suggests	that	if	the	fear	of	giving	punishment	we	should	not	give	is	what	
justifies	the	presumption	of	innocence,	then	we	need	to	be	as	careful	not	to	punish	more	than	
we	should	as	we	are	not	to	punish	when	we	should	not.	In	order	to	argue	against	this,	
someone	could	simply	deny	that	the	direct	moral	grounding	is	the	right	way	to	understand	the	
justification	for	or	value	of	the	PIP,	or	even	deny	that	the	PIP	standard	is	the	right	standard	to	
have	in	a	criminal	trial.14	These	responses	may	be	right	–	I	think	we	need	greater	philosophical	
reflection	on	the	purpose	and	grounding	of	the	PIP	–	but	I	am	going	to	set	them	to	one	side	
here.	After	all,	my	thesis	is	a	conditional	one,	based	on	the	(commonly	used)	direct	moral	
grounding.	(However,	even	though	I	am	accepting,	arguendo,	the	direct	moral	grounding,	the	
argument	here	nevertheless	contributes	to	the	assessment	of	the	adequacy	of	the	direct	moral	
grounding,	for	we	are	in	a	position	to	fully	evaluate	that	way	of	grounding	the	PIP	only	once	
we	fully	understand	its	ramifications	for	all	stages	of	the	criminal	justice	process.)	
	
If	an	adherent	of	(something	like)	the	direct	moral	grounding	wanted	to	block	its	apparent	
ramifications	for	Stages	1.ii	and	3	of	the	criminal	justice	system,	the	most	obvious	strategy	
would	be	to	point	to	important	differences	between	the	decision	made	at	Stage	2	(conviction)	
and	those	that,	together,	decide	how	much	to	punish	offenders.	The	main	difference	is	that	
what	we	decide	at	Stage	2	(and,	indeed,	Stage	1.i)	is	whether	to	declare	someone	a	criminal	
and	render	them	liable	to	punishment,	whilst	at	Stages	1.ii	and	3	we	decide	how	much	to	
punish	–	whether	to	punish	more	or	less.	Therefore,	the	decision	we	protect	with	the	
presumption	of	innocence	is	a	modal	one	(whether	the	person	be	branded	guilty	or	not)	whilst	
those	we	are	considering	here	are	of	degree.	
	
Why	should	this	matter?	Ultimately	the	direct	moral	grounding	seems	to	instruct	us	to	err	on	
the	side	of	caution	–	to	prefer	under-punishment	to	over-punishment.	Punishing	the	innocent	
and	punishing	too	much	are	both	instances	of	inappropriate	punishment.	One	reason	we	
might	see	an	important	difference	is	that,	as	I	have	observed	from	the	outset,	the	guilty,	of	
course,	(once	found	guilty)	have	no	right	to	be	presumed	innocent.	The	presumption	of	
innocence	may	be	more	than	an	epistemic	starting	point	we	instruct	juries	to	adopt	–	it	may	
be	also	reveal	a	condition	on	which	our	concerns	about	and	protections	against	inappropriate	
punishment	are	based.	Our	fears	may	not	be	of	inappropriate	punishment	tout	court,	but	
rather	a	specific	incidence	of	inappropriate	punishment	–	punishing	the	innocent.	In	other	
																																								 																				
14	For	a	provocative	utilitarian	argument	along	these	lines,	see	Laudan	2011.	
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words,	the	guilty	not	only	have	no	right	to	be	presumed	innocent,	we	ought	to	be	less	troubled	
by	the	idea	of	punishing	them	inappropriately.	
	
One	reason	this	might	be	the	case	is	that	once	we	know	you	to	be	guilty,	you	lose	the	status	
required	for	us	to	be	worried	about	mistreating	you	through	the	medium	of	punishment	(or	
your	status	is	this	sense	is	considered	lesser).	Yet	surely	we	insist	that	each	charge	against	a	
person	be	proven	beyond	all	reasonable	doubt,	even	after	they	have	been	found	guilty	of	one	
crime.	Imagine	Nina	is	charged	with	two	murders.	Now	imagine	that	she	is	found	guilty	of	the	
first.	Should	we	retain	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	beyond	reasonable	doubt	standard	
for	establishing	whether	she	committed	the	second	crime?	Yes.	Given	this,	it	can’t	be	that	just	
because	we	know	Nina	is	a	criminal	then	she	has	lost	status,	making	us	less	worried	about	
inappropriately	punishing	her.	The	argument	that	we	should	be	less	worried	about	
inappropriately	punishing	the	guilty	cannot	be	based	on	loss	of	status,	otherwise	we	would	be	
comfortable	with	a	lower	standard	at	trial	for	those	already	found	guilty	of	one	crime.	
	
Another	way	that	the	binary	choice	of	guilty	or	not	guilty	might	be	importantly	different	from	
the	scalar	decision	of	how	much	to	punish	is	to	do	with	censure.15	Criminal	law	theorists	often	
point	to	the	concept	of	censure	to	explain	what	is	distinctive	about	the	criminal	law,	and	
therefore	it	may	be	important	in	justifying	the	distinctive	procedural	protections	that	come	
with	that	area	of	law.	In	the	decisions	taken	at	Stages	1.i	and	2,	the	question	concerns	whether	
a	type	of	conduct	or	a	particular	person	ought	to	be	censured.	But	in	tariff-setting	and	
sentencing	decisions	we	have	already	decided	that	the	conduct	or	person	ought	to	be	
censured.	That	key	decision	has	been	made.	Now	(an	argument	might	go)	we	are	only	
deciding	how	much	hard	treatment	those	who	are	shown	to	have	acted	in	the	prohibited	way	
should	get.	And	since	censure	is	what	is	special	about	the	criminal	law,	and	it	is	inappropriate	
censure	not	hard	treatment	that	we	fear	(as	evidenced	by	our	comfort	in	distributing	hard	
treatment	on	the	basis	of	a	balance	of	probabilities	standard	in	the	civil	law),	then	we	can	
worry	less	about	errors	in	these	kinds	of	decisions.	The	question	of	censure	is	no	longer	a	live	
one.16	
	
																																								 																				
15	I	am	grateful	to	Lucia	Zedner	and	Mike	Redmayne	for	discussion	here.	
16	This	would	avoid	the	Nina	counter-example,	since	the	question	asked	at	trial	would	be	‘should	we	
censure	Nina	for	this	crime?’	and	so	she	should	be	equally	protected	against	inappropriate	censure	at	
each	trial.	
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To	back	up	this	thought,	we	can	distinguish	between	conviction	and	a	decision	to	punish.	
Thus	far,	I	have	written	as	if	what	worries	us	about	the	decision	to	convict	is	that	we	might	
inappropriately	punish.	However,	not	every	conviction	leads	to	punishment,	and	yet	we	think	
that	every	conviction	decision	should	be	protected	by	the	PIP.	This	may	suggest	that	it	is	not	
punishment	that	worries	us,	but	conviction.	Why	should	we	worry	about	conviction	but	not,	
to	the	same	extent,	about	punishment?	The	only	plausible	answer	seems	to	be	that	it	is	
conviction	that	carries	the	censure	of	the	community.	
	
There	are	two	problems	with	such	an	argument.	The	first	is	that	it	fully	distinguishes	the	
censure	and	hard	treatment	elements	of	punishment,	seeing	censure	purely	as	something	we	
do	or	don’t	do,	and	as	delivered	purely	through	conviction,	and	hard	treatment	as	an	
independent	imposition,	of	which	we	may	give	more	or	less.	However,	in	reality	censure	(a)	is	
delivered	through	hard	treatment,	and,	consequently,	(b)	is	not	simply	either	delivered	or	not.	
We	censure	murderers	more	than	we	do	litterers,	and	we	do	so	precisely	by	giving	them	more	
hard	treatment	than	litterers.	Given	this,	censure	goes	along	with	hard	treatment,	and	so	
censure	is	still	a	live	issue	in	sentencing	and	tariff-setting	decisions.	
	
Secondly,	while	the	division	between	‘no	censure’/non-criminal	to	‘some	censure’/criminal	
may	be	a	very	important	one,	it	is	intuitively	implausible	to	suggest	that	censuring	somebody	
who	should	not	be	censured	is	always	a	worse	error	than	censuring	somebody	too	much.	
Consider	innocent	people	who	are	fined	minor	amounts	in	criminal	law	courts.	They	are	
publicly	censured,	and	are	given	very	little	hard	treatment.	Now	think	of	the	person	given	a	
long	prison	sentence	after	being	(rightly)	convicted	of	littering.	This	second	error	is	far	more	
serious	than	the	first	–	even	though	some	censure	is	appropriate.	Given	this,	the	no	
censure/some	censure	line	cannot	be	all	that	matters,	and	even	if	it	needs	more	protection,	
similar	protection	ought	to	be	offered	against	mistakes	of	degree.	
	
It	is	also,	I	think,	implausible	to	think	that	inappropriate	conviction	is	feared	purely	because	it	
carries	inappropriate	censure	(as	defined	independently	of	punishment).	Conviction’s	status	as	
the	gateway	to	punishment	surely	plays	a	huge	role	in	its	normative	status	and,	consequently,	
the	need	to	protect	the	innocent	from	it.	
	
Another	thought,	along	similar	lines,	is	that	the	error	of	giving	too	much	punishment,	per	unit	
of	punishment,	decreases	as	the	level	of	punishment	increases.	So,	giving	501	units	of	
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punishment	when	500	should	have	been	given,	whilst	being	the	same	kind	of	error,	is	not	an	
error	of	the	same	magnitude	as	giving	one	unit	when	zero	units	should	have	been	given,	nor	
giving	eleven	units	when	ten	units	should	have	been	given.	Call	this	the	diminishing	marginal	
significance	of	over-punishment.	This	may	well	be	correct	–	it	seems	intuitively	plausible	–	but	
there	are	two	things	to	say	to	such	an	argument	pressed	against	my	thesis	here.	Firstly,	this	
would	suggest	that	while	we	can	be	more	comfortable	with	errors	in	sentencing	than	errors	in	
conviction,	at	the	least	we	need	a	sliding	scale	of	protection,	and	at	the	lower	levels	of	
punishments,	these	would	need	to	be	almost	the	same	as	the	trial	standard.	
	
Secondly,	while	the	diminishing	marginal	significance	of	over-punishment	seems	plausible,	so	
does	the	diminishing	marginal	significance	of	punishment.	It	may	well	be	the	case	that	you	
wrong	someone	less	by	giving	them	501	days	in	jail	rather	than	500	than	you	do	by	giving	them	
one	day	in	jail	when	you	should	give	them	zero.	But	it	is	more	important	to	punish	someone	
who	ought	to	be	punished	than	it	is	to	punish	someone	to	exactly	the	right	amount.	In	
recognising	the	importance	of	the	moral	line	between	guilt	and	innocence,	my	imaginary	
interlocutor	should	also	recognise	that	it	is	not	only	more	important	to	keep	the	innocent	on	
that	side	of	the	line,	but	also	to	get	the	guilty	over	it.	So,	at	the	higher	levels	of	punishment,	
not	only	are	the	errors	less	serious,	but	the	countervailing	considerations	in	favour	of	more	
punishment	(whether	retributive	or	deterrence-based)	also	seem	less	important.	Thus,	we	
should	expect	to	see	the	balance	of	reasons,	currently	highly	in	favour	of	under-punishment	
and	against	risking	over-punishment,	stay	in	roughly	the	same	place.	
	
Fair	warning	
I	would	argue	that	a	more	important	difference	between	conviction	decisions	and	quantity	of	
punishment	decisions,	and	one	more	likely	to	protect	tariff-setting	and	sentencing	decisions	
from	the	ramifications	that	a	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	seems	to	suggest,	concerns	fair	
warning.	Those	who	are	wrongly	convicted	didn’t	do	what	they	are	alleged	to	have	done.	
Those	who	are	punished	too	much	did	do	what	they	are	alleged	to	have	done,	and,	in	a	
country	within	which	rule	of	law	principles	are	adhered	to,	were	forewarned	that	their	
conduct	was	illegal	and	would	be	met	with	this	level	of	censure	and	sanction.	
	
Why	should	‘fair	warning’	make	overly	harsh	punishment	less	troubling?	It	cannot	simply	be	
that	the	people	were	forewarned:	telling	people	you	are	going	to	treat	them	unjustly	before	
you	do	it	is,	in	and	of	itself,	of	no	moral	significance.	(Consider	a	James	Bond	baddy	who	
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explains	to	his	victims	what	he	is	going	to	do	and	then	does	it.	This	is	morally	no	better	than	
just	doing	it).	The	important	difference	appears	to	be	that	those	who	are	rightly	convicted	but	
unjustly	punished	were	given	an	opportunity	to	avoid	the	conduct	which	has	landed	them	in	
trouble,	whilst	those	who	are	wrongly	convicted	are	not.	
	
I	certainly	think	this	opportunity	to	avoid	makes	an	important	difference	to	our	judgement	of	
the	person	who	is	punished.	The	person	has	been	foolish	or	imprudent	–	they	end	up	getting	
punished	when	they	could	have	avoided	this	punishment.	But	does	it	make	a	difference	to	our	
judgement	of	the	punisher’s	actions,	or	the	moral	badness	or	wrongness	of	the	over-
punishment?	Does	the	imprudent	behaviour	of	the	criminal	make	the	(ex	hypothesi	unjust)	
punishment	less	troubling	or	less	unjust?	I	am	not	sure	that	it	does.	Consider	this	example.	Ian	
is	confronted	by	a	highwayman.	The	highwayman,	as	is	customary,	offers	Ian	a	choice:	‘your	
money	or	your	life’.	Ian	refuses	to	give	his	money.	The	highwayman	kills	him.	Now,	Ian	has	
certainly	been	foolish,	in	a	way	that	someone	who	is	the	victim	of	an	ordinary	murder	is	not.	
But	does	this	make	Ian’s	killing	less	morally	troubling?	Can	Ian’s	imprudent	behaviour	make	
the	killing	somehow	less	unjust?	The	answer	would	seem	to	be	‘no’.	The	threat	was	an	unjust	
threat,	and	while	the	person	reacted	in	a	foolish	way	to	the	unjust	threat,	this	does	not	change	
the	fact	that	they	were	given	an	unjust	option	set.	
	
Of	course,	there	are	various	important	differences	between	Ian’s	case	and	the	case	of	someone	
who	acts	in	a	(justly)	criminalised	way,	but	is	given	a	prior	threat	of	unjust	over-punishment.	
Ian	has	a	right	to	act	in	the	way	he	does,	even	though	it	is	foolish,	whilst	the	person	who	fails	
to	respond	to	just	criminalisation	coupled	with	unjust	threats	of	punishment	has	no	such	
right.	But	the	person	does	have	a	right	not	to	be	threatened	with	that	–	the	threat	remains	
unjust.	Another	important	difference	is	that	the	highwayman	intentionally	makes	an	unjust	
threat,	and	intentionally	kills	Ian,	whereas	the	state	does	not	intentionally	over-punish	–	it	
does	so	because	of	moral	or	empirical	errors.	Regardless	of	these	important	differences,	the	
example	shows	that	foolishness	in	the	face	of	an	opportunity	to	avoid	some	conduct	does	not	
in	and	of	itself	seem	to	make	an	unjust	threat	based	on	that	conduct	less	unjust,	or	its	being	
carried	out	less	morally	problematic.	
	
Those	who	advocate	fair	warning/opportunity	to	avoid	as	marking	an	important	moral	
difference	between	incorrect	conviction	decisions	and	unjust	punishments	presumably	do	not	
think	of	fair	warning/opportunity	to	avoid	as	being	all	that	matters.	It	is,	after	all,	in	Andrew	
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Ashworth’s	words,	‘the	social	and	legal	consequences	of	being	convicted	of	a	crime’	(Ashworth	
2006,	83)	that	explain	why	the	PIP	is	so	important.	Therefore,	if	we	wish	to	accord	reasonable	
avoidability	(or	the	lack	thereof)	a	central	place	in	the	justification	of	the	PIP	then	it	must	be	
that	the	stringent	epistemic	conditions	of	the	PIP	apply	at	Stage	2	of	the	criminal	justice	
process	because	there	the	person	who	didn’t	do	it	is	threatened	with	unjust	punishment	which	
they	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	avoid,	whilst	those	who	did	will	be	punished	justly	for	
something	they	had	the	opportunity	to	avoid.	So	it	is	the	combination	of	unjust	punishment	
and	the	failure	to	provide	opportunity	to	avoid	that	makes	the	errors	of	conviction	particularly	
serious.	
	
If	this	is	the	case,	further	work	would	need	to	establish,	firstly,	how	inappropriate	punishment	
and	opportunity	to	avoid	relate	and,	secondly,	how	we	ought	to	weigh	the	two	kinds	of	
mistake	–	just	how	important	is	reasonable	avoidability	compared	with	disproportionate	
punishment?	
	
Before	going	on	to	make	some	observations	concerning	both	of	these	issues,	I	would	first	like	
to	note	that	if	it	is	accepted	that	the	lack	of	reasonable	avoidability	provides	some	of	the	
justification	of	the	PIP,	none	of	this	threatens	my	(weaker)	conclusion	that	the	grounds	of	the	
PIP	can	tell	us	something	about	how	we	ought	to	treat	the	guilty	–	if	the	fear	of	unjust	
punishment	plays	any	role,	then	it	ought	to	play	a	similar	role	in	figuring	how	much	
punishment	to	distribute.	In	addition,	I	think	that	the	discussion	here	helps	illustrate	how	
thinking	about	what	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	can	tell	us	about	other	areas	of	the	
criminal	justice	process	helps	us	think	through	whether	we	wish	to	endorse	the	direct	moral	
grounding	in	the	first	place,	and,	if	we	do,	how	best	to	develop	it.	For	example,	by	thinking	
about	whether	and	how	the	direct	moral	grounding	directs	us	in	our	treatment	of	the	guilty,	
the	question	of	what	role,	and	how	important,	the	lack	of	reasonable	avoidability	is	in	
justifying	the	PIP	becomes	more	vivid.	
	
To	turn	our	attention	back	to	the	question	of	how	reasonable	avoidability	and	unjust	
punishment	relate,	there	seem	to	be	three	possible	relations:	
1. Reasonable	avoidability	is	a	necessary	condition	of	just	punishment17;	
2. Reasonable	avoidability	is	an	element	of	just	punishment	–	it	contributes	to	the	
justness	of	some	punishment;	
																																								 																				
17	For	an	argument	against	this	stance,	see	C.H.	Wellman’s	example	of	Nazi	war	criminals	in	Wellman	
2012,	388.	
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3. Reasonable	avoidability	is	a	separate	consideration	from	the	justness	of	
punishment.	
	
Both	of	the	first	two	possible	relationships	make	reasonable	avoidability	part	of	the	justness	of	
punishment.	Seeing	things	in	one	of	these	ways	seems	to	put	us	in	a	position	whereby	the	
error	of	incorrect	conviction	is	objectionable	because	of	concerns	about	unjust	punishment,	
and	part	of	that	injustice	is	explained	by	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	avoid.	But	this	makes	
failure	to	provide	the	opportunity	to	avoid	punishment	the	same	kind	of	error	as	punishing	
when	we	ought	not	to	punish,	or	punishing	too	much	–	unjust	(undeserved,	for	example)	
punishment	is	what	we	fear,	and	failure	to	provide	opportunity	to	avoid	is	but	one	way	in	
which	a	person	may	come	to	experience	the	badness	or	wrongness	of	unjust	punishment.	
	
If	this	is	the	case,	our	argument	here	remains	intact	–	the	direct	moral	grounding	tells	us	that	
we	morally-speaking	ought	to	prefer	not	giving	unjust	punishment	over	giving	just	
punishment,	and	since	over-punishment	is	a	kind	of	unjust	punishment,	we	ought	to	be	very	
careful	not	to	deliver	it.	Only	if	lack	of	fair	warning	is	a	distinctive	kind	of	wrongness	can	it	
play	a	distinctive	role	in	the	justification	of	the	PIP,	and	one	that	is	not	present	in	the	case	of	
tariff-setting	and	sentencing	decisions.	
	
If	the	relationship	is	to	be	understood	in	this	way	then	this	raises	the	question	of	how	
important	lack	of	fair	warning	can	be,	compared	to	other	kinds	of	wronging.	Consider	this	
example:	people	who	are	over-punished	by	being	sentenced	to	death,	or	given	long	prison	
sentences,	for	littering.	These	people	suffer	a	massive	injustice,	even	though	they	were	
forewarned	of	it.	I	think	these	punishments	represent	more	serious	wrongs	than	fining	
someone	£20	for	littering	even	if	they	were	not	forewarned.	Opportunity	to	avoid	may	be	
important,	but	it	doesn’t	seem	to	me	to	be	the	only	thing,	or	even	the	most	important	thing,	
in	judging	whether	and	how	much	someone	has	been	wronged	by	some	punishment.	
	
Finally,	to	further	consider	what	work	fair	warning	can	do	in	splitting	apart	conviction	
decisions	from	punishment	decisions,	consider	this	from	the	two	perspectives	from	which	
punishment	decisions	are	made.	Judges	are	to	sentence	people	within	a	range	of	punishments	
of	which	they	were	given	fair	warning.	But	note	that	they	were	given	fair	warning	of	a	range,	
and	the	question	the	judge	must	answer	is	what	punishment	to	distribute	within	that	range.	
This	makes	the	role	of	fair	warning	complex.	In	some	sense,	the	criminal	was	given	fair	
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warning,	but	in	another,	and	in	the	sense	in	which	the	judge	has	to	make	the	decision,	they	
were	not:	they	were	not	told	where	in	the	range	their	punishment	would	sit.	And	since	it	is	
this	that	the	judge	must	decide,	the	judge,	perhaps,	cannot	think	of	the	person	as	having	been	
forewarned	in	the	relevant	sense.	
	
Now	consider	the	legislature.	The	legislature	does	not	have	an	individual	person	in	front	of	it,	
whom	it	can	say	has	been	forewarned.	Rather,	the	legislature’s	role	is	to	decide	what	
forewarnings,	what	threats,	it	ought	to	issue.	Everyone	will	therefore	be	forewarned.	The	
legislature	must	balance	the	goodness	that	can	come	through	its	warnings	and	punishments	
(retributive	or	deterrent)	against	the	risk	of	unjust	threats	and	punishments.	As	far	as	fair	
warning	is	concerned,	all	is	equal.	But	the	threat	of	unjust	punishment	remains.	It	must	decide	
what	to	warn	of	–	the	legislature	is	the	highwayman	here.	Therefore,	fair	warning	seems	
something	of	a	red	herring	from	this	ex	ante	perspective.	
	
An	argument	for	abolition?	
Is	this	an	argument	for	abolitionism?18	I	don’t	think	it	need	be.	At	its	most	mild,	the	thesis	
simply	says	that	the	direct	moral	grounding	of	the	presumption	of	innocence,	if	correct,	tells	
us	that	similar	concerns	ought	to	fuel	protections	for	those	who	have	been	found	guilty.	At	its	
most	extreme,	the	thesis	says	that	legislatures	and	judges	must	be	sure	beyond	reasonable	
doubt	that	their	punishments	are	not	overly	harsh.	Why	should	we	think	that	this	could	lead	
us	to	an	argument	for	abolitionism?	My	argument	here	relies	on	there	being	uncertainty	and	
disagreement	as	to	the	appropriate	level	of	punishment	for	a	given	offence	or	offender.	Some	
think	this	leads	directly	to	abolitionism.	Consider	the	following	argument,	adapted	from	one,	
specifically	aimed	at	retributivists,	made	by	Greg	Roebuck	and	David	Wood	(2011):	
1. It	is	impermissible	to	punish	someone	disproportionately;	
2. Due	to	moral	uncertainty	and	disagreement,	we	cannot	be	sure	that	our	
punishments	are	proportionate;	
Therefore		
3. We	should	not	punish.	
	
1.	gets	off	the	ground	when	we	think	of	intentionally	or	knowingly	punishing	someone	too	
much.	In	ordinary	circumstances,	this	will	be	impermissible.	However,	it	does	not	follow	from	
the	fact	that	it	is	impermissible	to	intentionally	bring	about	an	outcome	that	it	is	
																																								 																				
18	I	am	grateful	to	Doug	Husak	for	encouraging	me	to	address	this	question.	
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impermissible	to	risk	bringing	it	about.	For	example,	it	would	clearly	be	impermissible	to	
intentionally	run	over	a	child	in	your	car,	but	it	does	not	follow	from	this	that	it	is	
impermissible	to	drive,	even	though	driving	creates	a	risk	of	running	people	over.	
	
Consider	the	factually	innocent.	Again,	in	ordinary	circumstances,	it	will	be	impermissible	to	
intentionally	and/or	knowingly	punish	the	innocent.	At	the	least,	there	is	something	
regrettable	about	doing	so	that	is	not	present	when	we	intentionally	punish	the	factually	
guilty	(proportionately).	However,	if	we	were	concerned	about	never	punishing	the	innocent,	
we	would	have	no	punishment,	since	any	punishment	system	risks	punishing	the	innocent.	
Yet	rather	than	seeing	this	risk	as	a	reason	to	abolish	punishment,	we	are	prepared	to	risk	
some	non-intentional	unjust	punishment	in	order	to	secure	some	of	the	goods	of	just	
punishment.	I	don’t	think	retributivists	(or	anyone	else)	are	necessarily	committed	to	1.	in	the	
way	that	Roebuck	and	Wood	claim	they	are.	This	is	because	Roebuck	and	Wood	don’t	appear	
to	observe	the	distinction	between	objective	and	subjective	normative	claims,	and	make	the	
jump	from	something	being	objectively	objectionable	or	impermissible	to	risking	such	an	
outcome	being	subjectively	impermissible	under	conditions	of	uncertainty.	Retributivism	
claims	that	it	is	objectively	wrong	or	bad	to	punish	the	innocent,	or	to	punish	people	too	
much,	but	it	does	not	follow	that	it	is	always	subjectively	all-things-considered	wrong	to	do	so	
(or	risk	doing	so)	–	we	need	to	know	how	to	balance	different	risks.	Only	if	the	badness	or	
wrongness	of	undeserved	punishment	infinitely	outweighs	or	completely	overrides	the	goods	
of	deserved	or	appropriate	punishments	should	retributivists	accept	this	abolitionist	
conclusion.	Given	that	retributivists	generally	support	the	PIP	but	do	not	support	
abolitionism,	they	seem	to	accept	some	risk	of	unjust	punishment,	and	thus	deny	the	
subjective	position	that	Roebuck	and	Wood	suggest	they	accept.	Thus	I	don’t	think	people	are	
committed	to	1.	in	the	way	that	Roebook	and	Wood	need	them	to	be	for	their	argument	to	go	
through.19	
	
Therefore,	the	question	is:	how	much	risk	should	we	accept?	Let’s	say	that	the	more	extreme	
conclusion	of	the	argument	presented	here	is	true	–	that	we	ought	not	to	punish	unless	we’re	
sure	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	we	are	not	punishing	too	much.	Whilst	Roebuck	and	
Wood	may	be	wrong	that	(subjectively	speaking)	it	is	always	(all-things-considered)	wrong	to	
risk	over-punishing,	the	argument	here	says	that	as	soon	as	there	is	reasonable	doubt	about	a	
																																								 																				
19	See,	further,	Alexander	1983.	
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punishment’s	proportionality,	then	we	must	not	punish	beyond	that	level.	Could	this	be	an	
argument	for	abolitionism?	
	
It	could	be,	but	that	would	rely	on	the	validity	of	two	further	claims.	Firstly,	the	position	that	
giving	people	any	punishment	would	be	to	over-punish	them	must	be	a	reasonable	one.	Since	
we	must	only	punish	up	to	the	point	where	there	is	reasonable	doubt	about	the	punishment,	
this	position	only	supports	abolitionism	if	all	punishment	creates	reasonable	doubt.	Therefore,	
the	argument	must	rely	on	abolitionism	being	a	reasonable	position.	As	such,	it	is	not	in	and	
of	itself	an	independent	argument	for	abolitionism,	but	rather	one	that	tells	us	how	a	pre-
existing	reasonable	belief	in	abolitionism	ought	to	figure	in	our	moral	deliberation.	The	
abolitionist	may	have	the	scales	weighted	heavily	in	her	favour	with	this	argument,	but	she	
must	still	make	her	case	on	independent	grounds.	If	our	moral	uncertainty	is	between	whether	
murders	ought	to	be	punished	more	or	less	(but	not	at	all	about	whether	they	ought	to	be	
punished	at	all)	then	the	argument	here	says	we	ought	to	punish	them	less,	not	that	we	ought	
not	to	punish	them.	Uncertainty,	pace	Roebuck	and	Wood,	doesn’t	lead	us	to	no	punishment	
unless	no	punishment	is	(independently)	a	reasonable	option.	
	
But	in	order	for	this	argument	to	lead	us	to	abolitionism,	it	must	also	be	true	that	the	direct	
moral	grounding	of	the	PIP	exists	as	a	principle	and	grounding	external	to	and	not	within	a	
theory	of	punishment	or	criminal	law.	To	explain:	imagine	someone	who	affirms	the	direct	
moral	grounding	as	explaining	the	epistemic	standards	we	need	to	adhere	to	if	we’re	going	to	
have	a	system	of	criminal	law	and	punish	people.	Here	the	PIP	is	a	principle	for	use	within	a	
system	of	punishment,	and	not,	therefore,	a	principle	that	can	be	used	to	question	whether	we	
ought	to	have	such	a	system	at	all.	(After	all,	DMG1	asserts	the	justness	of	punishment).	We	
have	already	decided	to	punish	people,	the	question	is	who	and	how	much.	Another	way	we	
might	hold	the	PIP	is	as	a	fundamental	moral	position	–	if	we	are	going	to	punish	people	at	all	
we	must	be	sure	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	such	punishment	will	be	appropriate.	Here	the	
PIP	could	challenge	the	notion	of	a	punishment	system,	but	only	if,	as	explained	above,	
abolitionism	is	an	independently	reasonable	position.	
	
Conclusion	
When	people,	whatever	they	believe	the	best	interpretation	of	the	presumption	of	innocence	
(and	its	attendant	high	standard	of	proof)	to	be,	try	to	defend	the	PIP,	they	will	generally	
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reach	for	something	like	Blackstone’s	argument,	or	a	similar	moral	argument	that	focuses	our	
attention	on	the	dreadful	consequences	of	unjust	punishment.	
	
Here,	and	in	previous	work,	I	have	tried	to	show	that,	if	correct,	such	an	argument	has	major	
ramifications	for	how	we	should	behave	and	make	decisions	in	other	areas	of	the	criminal	
justice	process.	It	may	be	that	we	reject	these	ramifications.	But	in	order	to	do	so,	I	think	we	
either	need	to	abandon	our	existing	justifications	of	the	presumption	of	innocence,	or	to	
provide	more	nuanced	versions	of	them.	
	
Even	if	the	argument	does	not	go	through	undiluted,	it	seems	likely	to	me	that	there	is	an	
unjustifiable	cognitive	dissonance	between	the	extreme	lengths	we	go	to	in	order	to	protect	
the	legally	innocent	and	the	comparatively	cavalier	way	in	which	we	make	and	enforce	the	
criminal	law	(Husak	2008,	ch.	1;	Ashworth,	2000).	Furthermore,	the	very	grounds	on	which	we	
affirm	the	procedural	protections	we	endorse	at	trial	can	be	used	to	inform	a	more	careful	
approach	to	legislation	and	sentencing.	
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